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Paper No. 7-2004 
A simple solution to the surprise exam paradoxes 
 
A teacher announces 
There will be an exam some weekday of next week but no student will be justified 
in believing what day it will be before the close of the previous day. 
 
The smartest student, Alec, objects 
But the exam, as announced, cannot be on Friday. Otherwise by the close of 
Thursday I would justifiably believe that the exam is the next day.  
 
Having ruled out Friday, Alec then iterates this argument in backward calendar order to 
rule out the remaining weekdays, to conclude that the announcement cannot be true. But 
although Alec’s argument appears sound, it does seem possible for the announcement to 
be true.  Were the teacher to give the exam on Tuesday morning then Alec would be 
surprised in the sense that he would not have justifiably believed, by the close of 
Monday, that the exam is the next day. A variant on this paradox is to construe surprise 
as the absence of foreknowledge (Sorensen 1982a, 1982b, 1984).  Another family of 
paradoxes is constituted by Sorensen’s three recalcitrant formulations (Sorensen 1982a). 
Most commentators fail to distinguish two paradoxical reductios that Alec may 
advance1.  As it stands, his argument is flimsy.  He attempts a reductio of the supposition 
that the announcement is true by assuming that he would justifiably believe it throughout 
the week in virtue of justifiably believing it when it was made.  But this assumption does 
not follow, because the mere truth of the announcement is consistent with Alec’s failure 
to believe it when it is made (the essential but neglected point of Quine 1953).   
To repair this fault, Alec must suppose not only that the announcement is true but 
also that he justifiably believes it when it is made and therefore continues to do so 
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throughout the week.  But this strengthened supposition will not yield the conclusion that 
the announcement cannot be true.  It will yield instead the conclusion that he cannot 
justifiably believe it to be true when it is made.  This exchanges one paradox for another, 
since we may consistently suppose that Alec has good inductive evidence for believing 
the teacher’s words, in the form of her past record of following such announcements with 
a Tuesday exam. 
Alec is indeed correct to claim that he cannot justifiably believe the 
announcement if no exam has been set by the close of the penultimate day.  For then Alec 
would be justified in believing  
There will an exam tomorrow but I am not now justified in believing that there 
will be an exam tomorrow. 
 
But it is impossible to enjoy justification for any belief of the form  
p & I am not justified in believing that p2. 
Elsewhere (Williams 2004 I defended a principle implicit in the work of Gareth Evans 
(1982, 225-6): 
Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I 
believe that p. 
 
Now assume that I am minimally reflective and rational and that I enjoy justification for 
believing that p.  Then by Evans’s principle, I enjoy the same justification for believing 
that I believe that p.  But if I also recognize the truth of Evans’s principle then I should 
take myself not only as believing that p but also as enjoying the same justification for 
doing so.  This yields a corollary of Evans’s principle that  
Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I am 
justified in believing that p. 
 
Another plausible principle is that 
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Whatever justifies me in believing that (p & q) also justifies me in believing that p 
and justifies me in believing that q. 
 
Now suppose that I enjoy justification for believing that (p & I am not justified in 
believing that p).  By the conjunctive principle I enjoy the same justification for believing 
that p.  So by the corollary of Evans’s principle, I am ipso facto justified in believing that 
I am justified in believing that p.  But the conjunctive principle also yields the result that I 
enjoy the same justification for believing that I am not justified in believing that p.  This 
is logically impossible because whatever justifies me in believing that something is the 
case fails to justify me in believing that it is not the case and conversely.  So Alec cannot 
be justified in believing the announcement if no exam has been set by the close of the 
penultimate day.   
However it would be a mistake to conclude from this that Alec cannot be justified 
in believing the announcement when it is made (against Goldstein 1993).  Consider a 
one-day case in which the teacher announces  
There will be an exam tomorrow but no student will now justifiably believe that 
there will be an exam tomorrow 
 
In this case it is hard to think of any good inductive justification that Alec could enjoy for 
believing the teacher’s words.  But even if we could adduce such justification it would be 
decisively discounted by the deductive disproof of its possibility, as shown above.  By 
contrast, suppose in a multiple-day case that Alec knows of the teacher’s long record of 
following her announcement with a Tuesday exam and so is inductively justified in 
believing her words as she utters them.  This supposition is consistent with the 
impossibility of justifying a belief in the announcement when no exam has been set by 
the close of the penultimate day.   
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What now follows is that although Alec may be justified in believing the 
announcement when it is made, he cannot continue to be justified in believing it by the 
close of the penultimate day, if no exam has yet been given, despite the fact that his 
memory and access to information remain unchanged.  Since Alec’s argument relies 
crucially upon the assumption that his justification would so continue, his argument is 
unsound. 
Moreover there seems to be an independent counterexample to his assumption.  
On the first day of 1950, Alice knows that the nuclear arms race has already escalated 
dangerously and that there is every indication that it will continue to do so.   On this 
basis, Alice claims that 
I am justified in believing that there will be a nuclear war by the end of the 
century 
 
and promptly entombs herself in a sealed bunker in the Arizona desert in which her only 
contact with the outside world is a view of the sun rising and setting.  On the penultimate 
day of the century, having failed to observe a mushroom cloud on the horizon, she 
emerges from her bunker and repeats her claim.  Our strong intuition is that it was true on 
its first utterance but false on its second.  Alice has forgotten nothing that she knew in 
1950, nor is she aware of any change of information relevant to the likelihood of 
holocaust except her record succeeding peaceful days.  It seems then that her justification 
for believing that there will be a nuclear war by the end of the century is eroded by 
nothing more than her observation that each day has passed without change.   
The same solution applies to that version of the paradox in which surprise is 
defined as the absence of foreknowledge. Any reductio of the truth of the announcement 
is again bound to fail since we may consistently suppose that the announcement is true 
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but that Alec fails to know it when it is made.  The only other argument Alec may 
advance is a reductio of the possibility of his knowing the announcement when it is made.  
He indeed cannot know the announcement when no exam has been set by the close of the 
penultimate day, since nobody can know what is impossible for her to be justified in 
believing.  But this is consistent with the supposition that Alec has good inductive 
evidence for believing the teacher’s words when they are uttered, in the form of her past 
record of following such announcements with a Tuesday exam.  If knowledge is justified 
true belief, he may know that the teacher’s words are true as she utters them.  The same 
possibility arises on a truth-tracking account of knowledge.  Suppose that the teacher’s 
announcement is true and that Alec believes it when it is made. Suppose further that the 
teacher has made many such announcements in the past and that she is either entirely 
truthful or entirely untruthful with respect to them.  Then if her present announcement is 
false so were all her past announcements, perhaps because no such announcements were 
followed by any exam at all.  In that case, Alec would not believe the present 
announcement.  So if the present announcement were false then Alec would not now 
believe that it is true.  So he now knows that the announcement is true.   
However, someone who denies that justified belief is needed for knowledge might 
demand a different reason for the impossibility of knowing the announcement at the close 
of the penultimate day.  Happily one is available.  Alec cannot know that the 
announcement is true if no exam has been set by the close of the penultimate day.  For 
then Alec would know that  
There will an exam tomorrow but I do not know that there will be an exam 
tomorrow. 
 
But it is impossible to know any proposition of the form  
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p & I do not know that p 
Besides the uncontroversial principle that knowledge is factive: 
 If I know that p then p 
it is plausible to hold that knowledge distributes over conjunction: 
 If I know that (p & q) then I know that p and I know that q 
Suppose that I know that (p & I don’t know that p).  By the conjunctive principle I do 
know that p.  But by the same principle, I know that I do not know that p, in which case 
the facticity of knowledge ensures that I do not know that p.  Since this is a flat 
contradiction, Alec cannot know the announcement at the close of the penultimate day if 
no exam has yet been given. 
So although Alec may know the announcement when it is made, he cannot 
continue to know it by the close of the penultimate day, if no exam has yet been given, 
despite the fact that his memory and access to information remain unchanged.  Since 
Alec’s argument relies crucially upon the assumption that his knowledge would so persist 
throughout the week, his argument is again unsound 
Two interesting questions now arise.  Alec can know or justifiably believe the 
announcement before the start of the week yet cannot continue to do so at the close of the 
penultimate day if no exam has yet been given.  Does his knowledge or justification 
disappear at the close of the penultimate day or at an earlier point?  Or is the 
disappearance vaguely gradual?  Fortunately I need not answer these questions. I have 
already established all that is needed, namely the possibility that Alec knows or 
justifiably believes the announcement when it is made yet cannot continue to do so at the 
close of the penultimate day, if no exam has yet been given. 
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Sorensen’s three recalcitrant cases may be dealt with in the same way.  The first is 
designed to show that the paradox is not essentially temporal. The teacher takes five 
students, A to E, and puts them in an alphabetical queue, starting with A, so that each 
student can see the backs of all the students in front.  The teacher then announces 
Exactly one student has a star on his back but that student will not be justified in 
believing this before breaking formation. 
 
Student B argues 
But E cannot have the star.  Otherwise he would justifiably believe that none of 
the other students have it and so would be justified in believing that he has it.  
Since D will realize this, he cannot have the star either.  Otherwise he would 
justifiably believe that none of the other three students in front of him have it and 
so would be justified in believing that he has it. 
 
B then iterates this argument to rule out the remaining students to conclude that the 
announcement cannot be true.  But this may be contradicted by B’s discovery, on 
breaking formation, that he has the star. 
Once again B’s argument is flimsy, since the mere truth of the announcement is 
consistent with B’s failure to believe it.  He must instead suppose that he justifiably holds 
the true belief in the announcement in order to show that this supposition cannot be true.   
But this new reductio must assume that E is justified in believing the announcement, if he 
has the star.  But in that case E would be justified in believing that 
 I have the star but I am not justified in believing that I have the star. 
We have already seen that this is impossible.  Nonetheless B himself may justifiably 
believe the announcement.  After all, he may have inductive evidence of past 
announcements that have always been fulfilled.  So B’s new reductio fails. 
The second case is designed to show that the paradox does not involve knowledge 
of the number of alternatives.  A number of truthful and rational virgins are blindfolded 
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and made to hold hands in a line.  Each must signal, ‘Nobody to your right will be 
sacrificed’ by squeezing the hand of the virgin to her left just in case she knows that this 
is true.  The chief will execute the leftmost virgin if she is the sacrificial virgin, otherwise 
he will discard her and repeat the process.   The chief informs the virgins of all this and 
announces 
Exactly one virgin will be sacrificed but that virgin will not be justified, before 
being chosen, in believing that she will be sacrificed. 
 
An objector may now argue 
But if the sacrificial virgin is the rightmost then she will be justified in believing 
that she is the rightmost (since her right hand is free).  So once she is the last 
alternative (and both her hands are free) she will be justified in believing, before 
being chosen, that she will be sacrificed.  So she is now justified in believing that 
she is not the sacrificial virgin.  So she will squeeze the hand of the virgin to her 
left.  So once that virgin’s left hand is free she will be justified in believing 
beforehand that she is to be sacrificed.  So she too is now justified in believing 
that she is not the sacrificial virgin. The same applies to all the remaining middle 
virgins.  Finally, the leftmost virgin (whose left hand is free) will have her right 
hand squeezed and so will be justified in believing beforehand that she is to be 
sacrificed.  So she cannot be the sacrificial virgin either.  
 
Again this argument will not work as a reductio of the possible truth of the 
announcement, since the mere truth of the announcement is consistent with the failure of 
the virgins to believe it.  Instead the objector must suppose that the virgins justifiably 
hold the true belief in the announcement in order to show that this supposition cannot be 
true.   
But this new reductio must assume that once the rightmost virgin has both hands 
free then she would continue in being justified in believing the announcement.  But in 
that case the rightmost virgin would be justified in believing that 
 I will be sacrificed but I am not justified in believing that will be sacrificed. 
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We have already seen that this is impossible.  Nonetheless any of the virgins may be 
justified in believing the announcement before the chief starts to discard them. Even the 
rightmost virgin may have inductive evidence of past announcements that have always 
been fulfilled.  So the new reductio fails. 
The third case is designed to show that a rigid order of elimination is not essential 
to the paradox.  Consider the matrix: 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
A player is placed into one of the nine initial positions and tries to discover what that 
position was.  She may make at most two moves, namely Up, Down, Left or Right.  If 
she bumps into a wall, say by moving Left, her position is unchanged and her move is 
recovered as L. The game master explains all this to the player and announces  
 You are in an undiscoverable position. 
The player might now argue 
But if I am any of the corners then there is a sequence of two moves that would 
lead me to discover my position.  So I am not in any corner.  So knowing this, if I 
am in 2, 4, 6 or 8 then I may discover my position by making one bump.  So I am 
not in 2, 4, 6 or 8 either.  Therefore I must be in 5.  Since I have just discovered 
this, I cannot be in 5 either.  So the announcement cannot be true.   
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This argument is again unsound, since the mere truth of the announcement is consistent 
with the failure of the player to believe it.  Instead the player must suppose that she 
justifiably holds the true belief in the announcement in order to show that this supposition 
must be false.  But this new reductio must assume that since she justifiably holds the true 
belief in the announcement she will continue to do so, once she has made the two moves 
required for her to discover that she is in one of the corners.   
This assumption is false.  Suppose that the player is in 1 and has made the moves 
Up, Left.  Then the player must claim that she continues to be justified in believing 
 I am now in 1 but I am not now justified in believing that I am in 1   
For familiar reasons, this is impossible.  But there is no reason why she cannot be 
justified in believing the announcement at the time that it is made but before she has 
made any moves.  For at that point she may have inductive evidence of past 
announcements that have always been fulfilled.  So again the player’s new reductio fails.   
As I have argued above, the same solution would apply to versions of these three 
cases in which surprise is defined as the absence of foreknowledge.  The entire family of 
surprise exam paradoxes is therefore solved. 
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Notes 
1. Sorensen 1982, 1984 and 1986 and Olin 1984 represent the paradoxical argument 
as a reductio of the truth of the announcement but then rebut the reductio of the   
possibility of knowing or justifiably believing it. It follows that such rebuttal is 
strictly speaking, a superfluous response to the represented reductio. 
 
2. Olin (1984, 183) gives a more controversial argument for this impossibility:  
If a person A is justified in believing p, then he is not epistemically blameworthy in 
believing p.  But if A is justified in believing that he is not justified in believing that p, 
then he would be at fault in believing p  
But what strictly follows from the antecedent of this second claim is that A is 
justified in thinking that he is blameworthy, in other words that he is not 
blameworthy in thinking that he is to be blamed.  Whether it follows that he really 
is blameworthy is less clear.  An externalist about justification might insist that A 
may be justified in believing that p although he has good reason to think he is not.  
For example, suppose that I have good reason to think that I have swallowed a pill 
that makes my memory very unreliable when in fact the pill has no effect on my 
very reliable memory.  On the basis of seeming to remember that it rained 
yesterday, I come to believe that it indeed rained yesterday.  Am I not both 
justified and free of epistemic blame in that belief? 
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